

# **TRUST AND CITIZENSHIP FROM GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE**

By  
**RHEE, Flora**

## **THESIS**

Submitted to  
KDI School of Public Policy and Management  
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
For the Degree of  
**MASTER OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY**

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
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## **ABSTRACT**

Technological innovation has significantly reduced the time and distance across borders in the time of the 21st century. Nowadays more and more ordinary citizens are involved in the transnational integration of the world, and the flow of globalization seems to have diminished the role of the national state in protecting the legal rights of its citizens. At the same time, radical changes, such as immigration and an aging population, are bringing about a structural rearrangement in the entire world, with no exception of Asian society. This change suggests that the relationship between the state and civil society has become more important than ever. From this perspective, the trust relationship within civil society could be seen as an answer to socio-political uncertainties, since trust is known to be a key factor in maintaining a stable relationship within society. This study examines the conceptual framework of the existing literature on trust and citizenship, followed by an empirical study on Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, countries that share similar development paths and rapid economic growth experiences, often described as the “Asian miracle.” Using the fourth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) from the respective countries, this study statistically verifies the hypotheses via factor analysis, chi-square tests, analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests, Pearson’s and Kendall’s correlations, binary logistic regression, and multiple linear regression. In conclusion, the findings of this study suggest that in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, the level of interpersonal and institutional trust is highly correlated with the perception of national value. Also, contrasting results suggest that interpersonal trust is expressed in Taiwan as conventional citizenship such as voting and active participation, while in Korea and Singapore, this type of trust has led to an open attitude towards globalization and immigrant populations.

**Keywords:** Trust, Social Capital, Citizenship, Globalization, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **A. Background and Objective**

#### **1. Background**

Technological innovation has significantly reduced the time and distance across borders in the time of the 21st century. As a result, resources and ideas between different nations are being exchanged more easily and more frequently. Furthermore, faster and cheaper global communications have made it easier to organize groups of like minds around the world. At the same time, the rapid liberalization of national and international economies, the spread of electronic communications and informatization throughout the world have resulted in the emergence of a global civil society and a new form of citizenship (Falk 1992).

As such, global interactions differ from the past in important ways. Nowadays more and more ordinary citizens are involved in the transnational integration of the world, while previously it was the privilege of the government and the elite (Ferree 2006). Furthermore, in today's ubiquitous world, people can easily exchange opinions and develop the civic competence and trust needed to influence politics and public institutions. As a result, the flow of globalization seems to have diminished the role of the national state in protecting the legal rights of its citizens.

At the same time, radical changes, such as immigration and the aging population, are bringing about a structural rearrangement to the entire world, with no exception of Asian society. This change suggests that the relationship between the state and civil society has become more important than ever. Given this array of views, it seems worth examining the relationship between citizenship and the significance of trust as social capital, which is known to be an adhesive function that connects and integrates individuals in society.

## **2. Objective**

Given the above aspects, this study examines the relationship between citizenship and trust. Particular attention is paid to the transformation of citizenship in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, countries which share similar development paths and rapid economic growth experiences, often described as the “Asian miracle.” Using the fourth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) from the respective countries, this study attempts to analyze the common characteristics and the differences between the selected countries.

### **B. Scope and Methodology**

#### **1. Subject and scope**

In the second half of the 20th century, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore achieved unprecedented economic growth. Up to today, these nations remain the most dynamic economic zones in the world. Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita reached US\$ 87,100, \$ 49,500 and \$ 37,900 respectively in 2016, ranking 7<sup>th</sup>, 27<sup>th</sup>, and 46<sup>th</sup> among 230 countries (CIA World Factbook 2017). In addition, the three countries have responded rapidly to new technological changes and innovations. Consequently, the household Internet access ratio was 98.14% in Korea as of 2015, ranking first among 143 countries worldwide, and 86% and 74.9% in Singapore and Taiwan, ranking 11<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup> (World Economic Forum 2016). Furthermore, it is well known that the three countries which share a common cultural influence from Confucian tradition show a high educational fervor. According to the Human Development Index, Singapore is ranked 5<sup>th</sup>, Korea 18<sup>th</sup>, and Taiwan 27<sup>th</sup> among 188 countries worldwide (UNDP 2015, Taiwan National Statistics 2017). Presumably, the human resources in these countries have been an important source of this rapid growth.

**Table 1. Socio-economic indexes**

	<i>Press Freedom</i>		<i>Democracy</i>		<i>GDP per capita (PPP)</i>		<i>Households Internet access%</i>	
	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	%	Rank
<b><i>Korea</i></b>	34	73	7.92	25	\$37,900	46	98.14	1
<b><i>Singapore</i></b>	67	159	6.38	70	\$87,100	7	86	11
<b><i>Taiwan</i></b>	25	63	7.79	33	\$49,500	27	74.9	31
<i>Total countries</i>	210		167		230		143	
<i>Year</i>	2017		2016		2016-17		2015	
<i>Source</i>	Freedom House		The Economist		CIA Fact Book		World Economic Forum	
	<i>Fertility</i>		<i>Net migration</i>		<i>Population growth</i>		<i>HDI</i>	
	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Score	Rank
<b><i>Korea</i></b>	1.25	220	2.50	37	0.50	153	0.901	18
<b><i>Singapore</i></b>	0.82	224	13.10	6	1.80	60	0.925	5
<b><i>Taiwan</i></b>	1.12	222	0.90	59	0.20	182	0.885	27*
<i>Total countries</i>	224		222		235		188	
<i>Year</i>	2016		2017		2017		2015	
<i>Source</i>	CIA Fact Book		CIA Fact Book		CIA Fact Book		UNDP*	

Notes: The human development index of Taiwan is obtained from the data released by the Taiwan National Statistics through its website (<http://www.stat.gov.tw>).

Meanwhile, one might pose the question of whether the newly emerged civil societies in the three nations have contributed to more stable democracies. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index report (2016), Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are ranked 25<sup>th</sup>, 33<sup>rd</sup>, and 70<sup>th</sup> among 167 nations. Furthermore, their rank for the freedom of the press is far behind. In 2015, Freedom House's Press Freedom study (2017) reported that Taiwan is ranked 63<sup>rd</sup>, Korea 73<sup>rd</sup>, and Singapore 159<sup>th</sup> among 210 countries. Indeed, the democratic levels in the three nations seem to be significantly lower than their above-mentioned economic and technical progress. Despite economic achievements, each of the three nations is struggling with the chronic contradiction between the collectivist political order and its civic role. Historically, the frailty of the contractual basis has been observed in Asian society (Chang and Turner). Accordingly, Harvey (2006) observes correlation between dictatorship regimes and rapid economic growth in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. For example, in Korea, authoritarian

regimes were in power for decades in the latter half of the 20th century. The government backed by the military maintained a repressive state until the establishment of the civilian government in the early 1990s. Additionally, these three countries are expected to be facing demographic transition. In particular, the remarkably low fertility rate is one of the common challenges facing all three countries. As of 2016, Singapore had the lowest fertility rate among 224 countries worldwide, followed by Taiwan at 222<sup>nd</sup> and Korea at 220<sup>th</sup> (The CIA World Factbook 2017). Meanwhile, the population growth rate also remains at a low level. The rapid decline in the fertility rate is expected to bring about a serious labor shortage by mid-century. This demographic transition would lead to significant changes in the countries' social structures. Plausible solutions could be increasing reliance on migrant labor or outsourcing production to other regions around the world. As of 2017, net migration in all three countries recorded positive growth, indicating a higher influx population than the outflow (The CIA World Factbook 2017). It is therefore highly possible that overseas labor would result in decreased domestic jobs while the immigrant population increases, which may become a cause of conflict in domestic society.

Given all the uncertainties of the circumstances and the growing role of the individual citizen in international society, the time seems to be right to examine whether each society provides the basic elements for a stable and pluralistic democracy. From this perspective, the trust relationship within civil society could be seen as an answer to socio-political uncertainties, since trust is known to be a key factor in maintaining a stable relationship within society (Putnam 1993). In this regard, Pye (1999) explains that the answer requires going beyond the existing conceptual framework, and emphasizes an approach based on three related but distinct elements: civility, social capital, and civil society. The theoretical background of the civil, political and social rights debate could be found in the Western heritage of Thomas Humphrey Marshall which emerged within the teleological development of British history. Therefore, it

would be necessary to examine the concept of citizenship in the context of East Asian society (Holston 2001). Thus far, the above explored social and political contexts, seem to justify the choosing of each country as the focus of the study.

## **2. Methodology**

The introductory chapter explains the background of how citizenship and trust in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan are taken into account. Each of the subjects of study is handled independently in the next chapter. First, Chapter 2 explores the existing literature on the formation of trust and the different paradigms on citizenship. Chapter 3 explains the research designs and methods used to explore the results of the three countries' trust types and aspects of citizenship. The results of the research analysis are then elaborated in Chapter 4, with an examination of the interrelationship between trust and citizenship components and a review of how the results were derived. Finally, Chapter 5 focuses on a discussion of the research findings. This study examines the conceptual framework of the existing literature on trust and citizenship, followed by an empirical study on Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.

## II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

### A. Literature Review

#### 1. Trust

##### Trust and function of social capital

According to the results of the World Value Survey (WVS 2014), conducted in 59 different countries from 2010 to 2014, national pride in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan was lower than the average total. Furthermore, the aggregate answers in the three countries to the question, “do you consider yourself as citizen of the world,” were also at a below average level. Moreover, Koreans showed low trust in the government, and Taiwanese had low confidence in the media. However, Singaporeans showed a relatively high level of trust in general with a particularly high level of trust in the government. In addition, according to the results of the survey, Koreans are skeptical about household economy, and the voting rate and trust in foreigners are relatively low.

**Table 2. World Value Survey Results (2010-2014)**

	<i>General Trust</i>		<i>Trust in Government</i>		<i>Trust in Television</i>		<i>Trust in the press</i>		<i>Trust in Foreigners</i>	
	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
<b>Korea</b>	1.27	21	2.44	26	2.68	13	2.65	11	2.13	29
<b>Singapore</b>	1.37	13	3.01	5	2.68	15	2.67	10	2.47	10
<b>Taiwan</b>	1.31	18	2.39	30	2.28	42	2.19	42	2.4	15
<i>Average</i>	1.25		2.41		2.49		2.38		2.15	
<i>Score Scale</i>	2		4		4		4		4	

	<i>Household Economy</i>		<i>National Vote</i>		<i>National Pride</i>		<i>I see myself as a world citizen</i>	
	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
<b>Korea</b>	5.69	41	2.4	33	3.13	50	2.99	30
<b>Singapore</b>	6.41	16	2.56	21	3.36	41	2.89	35
<b>Taiwan</b>	6.39	17	2.69	12	2.82	58	2.94	31
<i>Average</i>	5.86		2.4		3.44		3	
<i>Score Scale</i>	9		3		4		4	

Source: World Value Survey wave 6 (2010-2014)

Notes: 1) Survey year: South Korea 2010, Singapore 2012, Taiwan 2012

2) Wave 6 of the WVS, conducted the survey in a total of 59 countries.

In this respect, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports that trust is a concept that represents the social capital itself by noting that “Trust is an acceptable proxy for social capital in the absence of a wider and more comprehensive set of indicators” (Healy et al. 2002). Putnam (1993) maintains that trust is the glue for civic life. According to him, social trust comes from the norm of reciprocity and participation. In other words, the higher the mutual trust of the community, the higher the probability of cooperation. At the same time, a high level of citizen participation and networking leads to a high level of generalized trust and reciprocity. Likewise, a large amount of literature has provided positive evidence between civic engagement networks and the average level of aggregate trust (Knack and Keefer 1997; Stolle and Rochon 2001).

### **Trust and the structure of social capital**

Nevertheless, several studies have shown no evidence of the hypothesized relationship between civic associations and enhanced trust (Häuberer 2011; Newton 2001). The contradictory results on the trust and network level can be explained by the structural approach of social capital, which draws a distinction between the structure and strength of the network. For example, Coleman (1988) claims that trustworthiness develops when social structures are closed, or when relationships exist among all subjects. Similarly, Bourdieu (1984) notes that social capital grows from the relationship and provides useful support when needed. In Bourdieu’s concept, individuals are meant to benefit from the relationship.

From another perspective, Burt (2015) and Lin (2002) conceptualized social capital with a structural model. According to Burt, the network can be either closed or open. If the relationship between all actors of the network is maintained, it is considered to be a closed state. If this relationship leads to the same information among the same people, then the relationship is regarded as overlapping. However, if some members of the network are related to members



of another network, the network is open. Consequently, an open network grants the benefits of a network to two actors in contact (Burt 2015). In the same vein, Lin defines social capital as a resource embedded in social relations. He argues that the closure of a network can have negative externalities because non-members of a group cannot access network resources, and network members cannot gather new information outside the network (Lin 2002). From Coleman's concept, closed structures cannot maximize social capital, whereas weak ties are not maintained.

As seen in the study by van Staveren and Knorringa (2007) on SMEs in Ethiopia and Vietnam, bridging social capital is measured between loosely connected people, so-called general trust. Furthermore, bonding social capital is measured from strong ties based on social identities such as family, blood relations, gender, or race, which show a particular type of trust associated with group members (van Staveren and Knorringa 2007).

### **Nature of trust**

Putnam (2001) explains that although social trust and political trust are theoretically connected, empirically they may or may not be linked. Putnam emphasizes that trust in the government may be the cause or result of social trust, but government trust and social trust are not the same.

Putnam's explanation of the relationship between social trust and political trust is as follows:

“Our subject is social trust, not trust in government or other social institutions. Trust in other people is logically quite different from trust in institutions and political authorities. One could easily trust one's neighbor and distrust city hall, or vice versa. Empirically, the social and political trust may or may not be correlated, but theoretically, they must be kept distinct. Trust in government may be a cause or a consequence of social trust, but it is not the same thing as social trust (Putnam 2001, 137).”

Many scholars claim that political trust or institutional trust differ from interpersonal or social trust by its nature. Interpersonal and social trust is based on direct contact with close individuals, personal life satisfaction (Whiteley 1999), and people in direct social relationships, whereas institutional trust is formed mainly by indirect means through mass media (Kaase 1999;

Newton 1999). In this study of nine European countries, Kaase (1999) showed that interpersonal trust is only weakly associated with political trust, and he concluded that interpersonal trust is not a prerequisite for political trust. Accordingly, a number of studies suggest that the performance of political institutions has the greatest impact on citizens' political trust. The degree of institutional trust is closely related to the performance of the government because political trust depends on a rational assessment of the citizens' institutional performance (Della Porta 2000; Hetherington 1998; Pharr 2000).

## **2. Citizenship**

Today, we all live in a cosmopolitan era in which interdependence transcends nationality under the influence of globalization (Armstrong 2006a). This implies that in the interrelated global community, behavior in one part of the planet inevitably affects others (Held and McGrew 2007). Global civil society is, defined by Armstrong, a place where individuals and groups coordinate the conditions of global integration and interdependence. Thus individual rights and responsibilities are directly linked. As a result, globalization has expanded the terms of national citizenship from citizenship limited to political and economic categories (Armstrong 2006b).

The origin of "citizenship," as the relationship between civil society and the state, can be found in the ancient city-state of Greece and ancient Rome. In the Greek era, citizenship, a notion derived from the Greek word for city (*polis*), embodied the concept of freedom from the private sphere (*oikos*) to the public domain (*police*), which enables collective rational and moral deliberation. Whereas citizenship in the Roman era set forth the legal rights as a premise, rather than political freedom (Shafir 1998; Beiner 1995). In this respect, modern citizenship originated from the ancient ideas of citizenship. However, it should be understood apart from that of the modern era because the modern notion includes not only the civic duty but also political rights (Gowar 2008b).

The concept of modern citizenship is largely divided into two approaches, liberal and republican, whereas the contemporary debate on citizenship is divided into liberal, communitarian, and socio-cultural approaches.

### **Modern citizenship between liberal and republican approaches**

In the liberal tradition, citizenship is regarded as a rights-based legal status, whereas the republican tradition emphasizes citizen participation. Fundamental to liberal thought is a rationally acting individual for the pursuit of one's interests, while, the role of the state is to protect citizens to exercise citizens' rights (Oldfield 1990). From the perspective of liberal theorists, citizenship is equivalent to formal membership of the nation-state, establishing an identity that promotes the equality of rights and obligations. As such, from the liberal perspective, the right to vote constitutes a priority form of participation for a democratic system (Jones and Gaventa 2002). Notably, the right of participation has long been a key concept of liberal thought, which implies a comprehensive right to political participation, but the exercise of rights is considered optional on the premise that citizens have the necessary resources and opportunities (Isin and Wood 1999).

However, it is important to note that basic rights, such as the freedom of expression and the equality of all individuals, were not established until the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries (Marshall 1964; Crotty 2017). During post-World War II England, Marshall expanded the concept of modern citizenship analysis. He denotes that "citizenship is a status given to those who become full members, having equal rights and duties imposed" (Bottomore 1992). Moreover, it is interesting to note that Marshall understands citizenship as civil, political, and social rights. In conceptualizing citizenship and civil identity, he includes social rights in addition to existing politics and civic rights (Marshall 1950).

For liberal scholars, it is natural that citizenship as a practice and identity is bound to the

institution of the state. Therefore, Rawls (1971) sees citizens as being capable of understanding justice and the concepts of right and wrong, and of creating a free and equal society. He claims that citizens should have equal rights to participate and make decisions in the constitutional procedures while being devoted members of the community. In this array of views, Turner (1993) understands the notion of citizenship as the totality of legal, political, economic, and cultural practices of a competent member of society who is able to determine the flow of resources to people and social groups.

However, there are counter-arguments from republican scholars who claim that state freedom and personal freedom cannot be separated, because the will of the citizens determines that of society. In contrast to the liberal concept that emphasizes the rights of individuals, the republicans highlight the political nature of people and see citizenship as an active activity rather than a passive one (Delanty 2003). The main characteristic of the republican view is democratic citizenship based on active participation; thereby it is also referred to as “citizen-republicanism.” Moreover, the republican approach emphasizes the moral, formal, and legal dimensions beyond the liberalist viewpoint. In this regard, Tully (2009) makes a distinction between “civil” and “civic” citizenship, by describing “civil citizens” as the status of persons who are at liberty, whereas “civic citizens,” are seen as active participants. From this view, he defines civic freedom as manifestation and participation, and civic rights as products of civic activity.

### **Contemporary citizenship: communitarian and socio-cultural approaches**

#### **Communitarian approach**

The social-centric citizenship model’s tradition lies within the perspective of Tocqueville. Tocqueville, who studied the United States in the 1830s, viewed civic engagement not only as a duty to public life but also as a personal reward, and as such, people in a democracy are

connected and develop as individuals. Tocqueville points out that the center that enhances trust and community solidarity is within civil society rather than the state or public institutions. Accordingly, Tocqueville emphasized that the vitality of democracy lies in the solidarity of associations such as voluntary groups, and organizations (Tocqueville 1966; Stolle and Rochon 2001).

More recently, the republican tradition has been largely represented by communitarianism (Delanty 2007). The issue of identity has been raised in the debate on citizens' rights, and the concept of the individual is substituted by the community, considering it as a key axis of citizenship (Walzer 1995). According to Walzer, communitarians claim that citizens require necessary rights in order to participate in a proper institutional environment for the sake of sociability itself. He also notes that if the state is completely revoted from civil society, the state cannot survive and that the two parties interacting in complementary ways are indispensable (Walzer 1995). Likewise, Oldfield (1990) claims that citizenship is not about altruism, but about recognizing community goals as their own, choosing for oneself and dedicating them to the community.

Republican and communitarian theorists argue that the area of citizenship remains at the national level. However, the process of globalization altered the meaning of national citizens. In this respect, other scholars advocating a cosmopolitan position acknowledge that the state is no longer an exclusive political unit regarding citizenship (Holston 2001). Likewise, nowadays, the concept of citizenship based on a state-centered approach has become difficult to apply to other social groups such as ethnic minorities and migrants.

### **Socio-cultural approach**

Some scholars have seen that the real challenge in the future will be to bring about the idea of inclusion of different ethnic groups. In this sense, they propose the concept of "cultural citizenship" as an expanded concept replacing the existing multiculturalism (Pakulski 1997;

Turner 2001). Thus far, societies have often used symbolic boundaries around their members based on their place of birth, relationship, class, ethnicity, race, gender, religion, a boundary that would define insiders and outsiders, rights and obligations (Baker and Shryock 2009). Hence, discussions on “cultural citizenship” inevitably imply a social transition, conflicting political agendas, and ideologies. From a similar standpoint, Shelat (2014) claims that the concept of “transcultural” citizenship better represents the concept of modern citizenship compared to “global” citizenship since interactions between other cultures are more often based on interpersonal relationships with horizontal communications, rather than legal-political, institutional governance.

### **Cosmopolitan citizenship: globally oriented citizens**

Confronted by the free economy that threatens the sovereignty of the state and the rapid growth of immigration, globalization seems to erode the existing national boundaries. As a consequence, it is widely accepted that the globalization process has a significant influence on the practice and theory of citizenship (Heisler 2001; Sassen 2002). Thereupon, theoretical discussions are being conducted on the role of the individual and the influence of globalization on political participation.

Scholars such as Nussbaum (1996) have argued for the resurgence of global citizens. Many scholars agree that a broader definition of citizenship, traditionally understood as a unit of rights, duties, participation, and identity, which meets the modern international context (Beck and Ritter 1998; Giddens 1990) is required. Other scholars even argued that people need to institutionalize the idea of today’s global citizenship (Falk 1995; Held 1995). Nevertheless, for Nussbaum (1996) world politics are not a precondition for global citizenship. She uses the term “world citizenship” by emphasizing the moral category of world citizenship and the role of education, for whom world citizenship is seen as a realm of sentiment, but not a political

category. She argues that personal behavior as a global citizen does not require state institutions, and underlines the role of educators to break down barriers between different nationalities and ethnic groups, to develop a community of global dialogue and interest. Meanwhile, Delanty (2007) argues that a wider concept of citizenship is solicited to understand the challenges of globalization. Delanty thus uses the term “cosmopolitan” citizenship. He argues that cosmopolitan citizenship is not just an additional kind of citizenship, but an inclusive idea of all forms of citizenship. In this regard, the sociological notion of “cultural citizenship” emphasizes crossing multicultural diversity borders within national society and reaching new sphere of identity and belonging.

The universality of the global citizen, namely cultural or cosmopolitan citizenship, is often perceived as a contradictory concept of “state” and “state citizenship” (Armstrong 2006a). In this regard, controversies converge on two major issues: the first is the lack of global governance; the second is the problem of global citizens being rootless nomads (Zolo and Rubenstein 2003). Critical communitarians argue that the cosmopolitan approach underestimates the power and function of the state (Walzer 1996; Miller 1999). Communitarians and republicans also point out that global democracy itself is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for effective international cooperation. The issue is thereby developing and encouraging citizens to be politically aware, in order to contribute to the country's vision (Slaughter 2005) more cooperatively.

While developing a heated discussion of the political identity of global citizenship, some are adversely affected by globalization and have turned towards “territorial citizenship” and defensive patriotism (Falk 1989). After all, as Zolo points out, globalization may not bring about global cultural homogenization. The movement of wealth, information, science, and technology affects the labor force by exacerbating the gap between the wealthy and the have-nots (Zolo 2003).

As an alternative, some scholars suggest new approaches that embody citizenship at the local, national, and transnational levels (Ehrkamp and Leitner 2003; Gowan 2008a). For instance, Armstrong (2006a) observed that despite the claim to the discourse of global citizenship, certain parts of citizenship remain resolutely “non-global” and notes that “national sovereignty” and citizenship are not “internationalized.” He notes that the current world order consists of “global” capital, goods, information and human rights, but responsibility for such issues as poverty, development and human rights remains limited at the state level. Thereby, Armstrong suggests that what best characterizes today’s world can be the coexistence of various citizenship and not a transition from state to international citizenship.

In addition, Parekh (2003) has proposed “globally oriented citizens” referring to those who recognize the reality and value of the political community, and who pursue the political community. In the same vein, he suggested using the notion “internationalism” instead of “cosmopolitanism.” For Parekh, globally oriented citizens not only seeks “internationalism” but also patriotism, rootedness in one’s society and openness to others, and maintains a balance between conflicting values (Parekh 2003). In brief, discussions of alternative citizenship suggest that citizenship identity has become increasingly more flexible and relational.

### **Asian countries: developmental citizenship**

According to Lucian W. Pye (1999), all societies have their own rules about civility, which forms an integrated functional society and prevents confusion, disorder, and anarchy. Conceivably, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have been the subject of several comparisons because of their shared history of Japanese occupation, the timing of their industrial development, and the similarity of the state’s intervention in their economic policies. The developmental agenda which intervenes with economic planning by promoting export-led industrialization has been regarded as the catalyst for this growth in this region (Park 2004).



The three countries also share the background of Confucian cultural heritage. Regarding this background, Turner (2012) points out the shortcomings of the Confucian tradition which has been an important constraint on the development of participatory citizenship in Asia, and which has made citizens conform to the social order, rather engaging as social citizens (Chang and Turner 2012).

Many scholars argue that citizenship in East Asia should be understood differently from Marshall's definition or Western "social citizenship." For instance, Turner (2012), in this regard, draws a distinction between social citizenship and national citizenship. He defines national citizenship as a political identity for the construction of the nation, based on nationalism. He also notes that national citizenship is more related to creating exclusive boundaries and political identities. Furthermore, Williams uses the term "low-quality democracy" or semi-democracy to illustrate many Asian societies' compliant populations, authoritarian norms, and relatively subservient elite groups, which are seemingly the legacies of communism, anti-colonial wars, and civil war (Williams 2003). In addition, to elucidate the above characteristics of Asian citizenship in contrast to European social citizenship, Chang (2012) uses the terms "developmental citizenship." He observes the practice of citizenship in East Asia with a focus on South Korea and claims that the main concern of both national elites and ordinary citizens has mostly focused on economic development and material pursuits, rather than civil liberties. Moreover, it is worth noting that the original assumption of Western liberalism was that, in the long run, competitive capitalism would enhance individual rights. However, this assumption has been revised as corporate capitalism, globalization and financial domination continued growing. Instead, relatively low wages, minimum welfare and harsh working conditions have been imposed in favor of rapid economic growth and world competitiveness (Chang 2012). Nonetheless, one may easily assume that the difference between Western and Asian citizenship may become less and less important, as globalization today has a direct impact on the world

economy and global capitalism. Yet, in the famous 1993 essay on the clash of civilizations, Samuel Huntington claimed that from a Western perspective, there would be a world of other civilizations rather than a universal civilization in the relevant future (Huntington 1993). In the same vein, Chang and Turner maintain that globalization did not bring about a set of cosmopolitan values, but on the contrary, the restoration of nationalism. They, therefore, question whether the rights, values, and institutions that underpin citizenship can survive with these monumental social and political transitions (Chang and Turner 2012).

In the 21st century, where globalization and trans-nationalization continue to accelerate, civil society and enhanced citizenship are essential for the valid implementation of the democratic world. Composed of various independent interest groups and citizens who are able to exert pressure on the state, civil society is expected to be a stepping-stone to the next step leading to the development of a democratic political culture in a boundless world. In short, by comparing South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, it is expected to broaden the scope of the study and reveal important insights that would improve the understanding of the subject matter.

### **Measurement criteria for citizenship**

For empirical analysis, this study examines the central components of citizenship in the 21st century, as identified through quantitative studies. These studies have shown the importance of empirical analysis that provides quantitative guidelines to better understand the evolution of different communities.

Firstly, a report by the Commonwealth Foundation and CIVICUS (1999) summarizes the findings of its research, which explored how citizens perceive their citizenship, based on answers collected from thousands of citizens from 47 Commonwealth countries. The study found that expected citizens are those who: (1) fulfill basic needs; (2) form associations with other people (with respect to culture and heritage, cooperation, caring, and sharing in the

community/society); and (3) participate in the governance of society for the pursuit of equal rights and justice, and responsive governance.

Also, Helmut Anheier (2001) examined the feasibility of developing a Global Civil Society Index, with the aim of establishing a set of indicators that measure global civil society. In this study, the basic unit of analysis for a global civil society is categorized into two different segments: organizational infrastructure, and individual participation and identity. The latter, “individual participation and identity” consists of indicators of: (1) social and political participation; (2) cosmopolitan values; and (3) identity (belonging).

Lastly, it would also be helpful to examine, theoretically connected citizenship criteria from a psycho-sociology study. For example, W. Lance Bennett, Chris Wells, and Deen Freelon (2011) define a different type of “actualizing citizenship” from the traditional “dutiful citizenship,” which is declining among younger generations, particularly in the United States. The suggested “actualizing citizenship” model is a form of personal involvement that maximizes the representation of individuals by using peer group networks and social technologies, away from the interest of public authorities. The traits of two different models are distinctly described as follows:

- **Actualizing Citizenship**

- Oriented around citizen input to the government or formal public organizations, institutions, and campaigns
- Rooted in responsibility and duty
- Channeled through membership in defined social groups

- **Dutiful Citizenship**

- Open to many forms of creative civic input, ranging from government to consumer politics to global activism
- Rooted in self-actualization through social expression
- Personal interests channeled through loosely tied networks  
(Bennett, Wells, and Freelon 2011, 838–40)

### **3. Previous empirical studies**

Empirical studies using multilevel survey analysis of trust and social participation are realized in various academic fields. The central areas of research are the classification of trust types, the association between institutional trust and social participation, and government efficiency. In addition, several studies have examined the trust characteristics of Asian countries. Some key empirical research examples, methodologies, and results are discussed in the following.

Firstly, some studies claim that trust is the most important factor for government efficiency and life satisfaction, among various elements of social capital. For example, Christian Bjørnskov (2007) examined cross-country data from three different waves of the World Value Survey (WVS 1990–2001) to identify Putnam's claim on social capital. Bjørnskov divided social capital into three components according to Putnam's definition, which corresponds to social trust, social norms, and coalitions. He then concluded that trust alone influenced governance and life satisfaction.

Another study shows that social trust and political trust are not always related to one another, and should be considered different elements. In this regard, Kenneth Newton (2001) examined plausible relations between social trust and political trust based on the WVS (1991–95) from 44 nations, the result of which suggests that high levels of social trust are associated with high levels of political trust, and vice versa. Meanwhile, he also found that political trust and social trust have a commonality in many respects, but that they are also different in other respects. Social or personal trust is formed by immediate and direct experiences with others, but political trust is usually formulated indirectly through the media. Therefore, he admits that there are some exceptions to the general rules. The causal factor he defines is the efficiency of social and political institutions that influence the association between individual trust and political trust.

Other scholars have examined the relationship between social participation and trust with

governance and economic performance. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer (1997), for example, obtained results that are consistent with Putnam's theory. In an analysis of trust and indicators of civic norms from the WVS realized in 29 countries, they found that societies with greater trust tend to show better government economic performance. They confirmed that trust and citizenship norms are stronger in population groups that have a relatively equal and high-income level, better education, and homogeneous ethnicity. Importantly, however, they also found that memberships in the formal groups, which is one of Putnam's critical measurements of social capital, is not related to trust or a high level of economic performance.

Lastly, a more recent social capital study of citizenship and democracy in Asian countries by Kwang-Il Yoon, and Chong-Min Park (2017) shows interesting results. This research based on the fourth wave data of the ABS of 13 East Asian countries explored the implications of social capital in East Asia for citizens' attitudes toward political engagement and the quality of governance. Through a multilevel analysis, they found that bridging group membership does not increase political involvement, such as an interest in politics, news consumption, and discussion of political issues, while generalized trust shows a positive relationship. Further, it has been found that the influence of Confucian tradition tends to inhibit political participation, suggesting that the citizens belonging to societies built on Confucian culture are rather allegiant to the social rules.

## **B. Scope and Limitations**

A vast array of socio-political studies have examined the nature and scope of citizens in a global society, drawing on normative concepts from different paradigms. However, only a few studies have addressed the constituent elements of analysis or methods of analysis of the subject. The conceptual approach alone can make it difficult to identify the actual manifestation of the citizenry in different backgrounds and to understand possible causal relationships with other

determinants of the society.

Furthermore, a great amount of literature focuses on the causal factors of social trust or the positive influence of institutional trust, but there are relatively few studies on interpersonal trust or international trust. Admittedly, interpersonal or international level approaches may be difficult to apply to social studies because both relationships reside either beneath or beyond the national boundaries. Nonetheless, from the previous studies, it is claimed that trust is manifested in significantly different ways depending on the cultural background. It is also shown that the effect of trust varies depending on the subject of trust. Many scholars suggest that as an element of social capital, strong trust among the specific group members can induce collective exclusiveness towards outside non-members. As such, trust could become a serious cause of conflict when applied to globalizing society, and especially in a society, where a strong inner-group relationship is prevalent.


In this respect, this study attempts to analyze not only the positive impacts on the manifestation of citizenship but also the negative influences of trust and its constituents. In the following part of this study, hypotheses and relevant variables will be established based on the implications from the above literature and previous studies.

### III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

#### A. Analysis Model

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between trust and citizenship in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan in the context of globalization. In order to examine the relationship between social capital and citizenship, the implications from the literature and previous studies are reflected upon. Thus, the components of trust and citizenship are itemized into different components. Trust is divided into three elements, namely institutional and interpersonal trust, and that of the media. Citizenship is set to electoral participation, active participation, national value, cosmopolitan value, and tolerance for immigration. Gender, age, educational background, household economy, and the use of the Internet are included in control variables. The research model is as illustrated in Figure 1.

**Figure 1. Analysis Model**



## B. Hypotheses

Based on the above discussion, this study examines the relationship between trust and citizenship, taking account of the socio-economic factors of the three Asian countries. Specific research questions addressed in this study and relevant hypotheses are discussed in the followings.

The first research question is whether trust can be divided into three categories, namely, institutional trust, interpersonal trust, and trust in the media. In the previous studies, theorists explained that institutional trust is distinct from interpersonal trust, so-called social trust or general trust (Kaase 1999; Newton 1999; Putnam 2001; Whiteley 1999). Moreover, it seems important to recognize the function of the media as serving as the medium for institutional trust, given the fact that people generally form their trust toward institutions indirectly through mass media (Newton 2001). Assumedly, trust in the media could be categorized as another type of trust.

*H1: Interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and trust in the media affect the manifestation of citizenship in a distinct manner. In other words, interpersonal trust, institutional trust and trust in the media are all different forms of trust that they are mutually independent.*

The second research question concerns whether the function of trust could be applied not only at the national level but also at the global level, and how citizenship differs in each case. In this regard, while republicans and communitarians emphasize the role of the state within the boundaries of the state and citizens' active participation (Miller 1999; Oldfield 1990; Slaughter 2005; Tully 2009; Walzer 1995, 1996), some scholars maintain that the "world's citizens" do not presuppose a framework of national institutions (Nussbaum 1996; Shelat 2014). Meanwhile, other scholars alternatively suggest that the coexistence of various types of citizenship is possible (Armstrong 2006a), globally oriented citizens not only require "internationalism" but



also patriotism, rootedness in one's society and openness to others, and a sense of balance between conflicting values (Parekh 2003). From the alternative citizenship argument, this study investigates the impact of three types of trust and examines how citizenship appears in national and international contexts, with the assumption that the coexistence of national and global citizenship is possible. In accordance with the republican and communitarian approaches that limit citizenship within the national realm, this study will examine whether citizenship at national-level is influenced by institutional trust and trust in the media. On the contrary, in accordance with Nussbaum (1996)'s assertion that the national institution is not a precondition of "world citizens," this study will investigate whether interpersonal trust is correlated with global-level citizenship, assuming networks are bound to be based on the trust between non-state actors, beyond institutional intervention. Consequently, the following hypotheses have been formulated:

*H2: Institutional trust and trust in the media are positively related to national citizenship (electoral participation, political and social participation, national value).*

*H3: Interpersonal trust positively influences citizenship related to globalization (cosmopolitan value and tolerance for immigrant population).*

Thirdly, given the fact that all three countries have experienced rapid socioeconomic transitions over the last century, this study assumes that age groups will show marked differences in the value of citizenship, indicating a rapid change in the concept of citizenship from one generation to the other. In other words, the influence from the tradition of Confucianism would appear more strongly in the elderly group, who have a relatively higher duty and loyalty to the nation, than younger generations who are more open to the global environment. Regarding the generation gap, the following hypothesis has been elaborated.

*H4: All three countries will show considerable differences in age-based trust and citizenship.*

Additionally, the study by Knack and Keefer (1997) indicates that societies with greater trust tend to show better economic performance, and a high-income economy leads to a high level of trust. Moreover, another study claims that prejudice towards outgroups increases if competition in the labor market is prevalent, whereas competition for scarce resources increases collective conflict (Burns and Gimpel 2000). Therefore, this study will test whether citizens who are more satisfied with their household economic conditions are more likely to be satisfied with other members of society and show higher trust towards others.

*H5: The level of overall household economy satisfaction is positively related to the overall level of trust and tolerance for immigrants.*

Lastly, in the previous studies, Bennett et al. (2011) differentiated the “actualizing citizenship” from the traditional “dutiful citizenship.” According to them, “actualizing citizens” focus on the representation of individuals through the greater use of peer group networks and social technologies, with less regard for public authorities. Further, In line with Burt's “structural hole” theory (Burt 2015), this study will examine whether members at the linking point of new information are likely to be more open to the outside world.

*H6: The level of education and use of the Internet positively influence citizenship related to globalization (cosmopolitan value and tolerance towards immigrants)*

## **C. Measurement of Variables**

### **1. Trust: independent variables**

As the previous literature claim, trust is a factor that generates more integrated societies. Accordingly, if trust promotes social norms, and coalitions (Putnam 1993; Bjørnskov 2007), it can also be assumed that trust will have a positive impact on citizenship. To measure this possible impact, trust is divided into three components as follows:

### **Institutional trust**

Many scholars claim that individuals tend to hold opinions about the trustworthiness of abstract systems, and institutional trust is different to interpersonal trust by its nature. Therefore, institutional trust is measured by asking, if the respondent has trust in (1) president; (2) court; (3) national government; (4) Political parties; (5) Parliament; (6) Civil service; (7) The military; (8) The police.

### **Trust in the media**

This study separated trust in the media from institutional trust components. In the latter part of this study, it is statistically proven that trust in the media is distinct from other governmental, legislative institutions. Further, as per Newton (2001) who mentioned that political trust is usually learned indirectly through the media, this study presumes that trust in the media to be a link between interpersonal and institutional trust. Therefore, trust in the media is measured by asking, if the respondent has trust in (1) Newspapers; (2) Television.

### **Interpersonal trust**

Interpersonal trust refers to trust between people personally known to each other, including generalized trust beyond the boundaries of acquaintances (Stolle and Rochon 2001). Although social capital theory generally makes a distinction between interpersonal and generalized trust because of the difference in the strength of the relationships, a precise distinction between these two elements of trust is still a matter of debate. Likewise, in the latter part of this study, it is analytically proven that interpersonal trust and general trust are statistically not distinct from each other. Interpersonal trust is measured, including the typical “general trust” question, (1) “most people can be trusted,” with other questions on (2) trust in relatives; (3) neighbors; (4) Other interacting people.

## **2. Citizenship: dependent variables**

### **Electoral participation**

Voting is one of the most important rights of every citizen and an indicator of a healthy democracy. Moreover, according to Putnam, higher levels of social trust increase voter turnout and political participation rates (Putnam, 1995). “Electoral participation(voting)” is a dummy variable with value 1 for voter and value 0 for abstainer.

### **Active participation**

According to social capital theories the higher the level of mutual trust in a community, the higher the probability of cooperation and participation (Putnam 1993; Knack and Keefer 1997; Stolle and Rochon 2001). “Active participation” is measured by aggregating questions, (1) Did you attend a campaign meeting or rally?; (2) Did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party? ; (3) Did you do anything else to help out or work for a party or candidate? ; (4) Whether you personally have ever got together with others to try to resolve local problems ; (5) Got together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition ; (6) Attended a demonstration or protest march

### **National Value**

Falk (2000) claimed that political identity is shifting away from the nation-state towards notions of “global citizenship,” and many adversely develop a stronger sense of territorial citizenship and defensive patriotism. Accordingly, “National Value” is measured by aggregating questions, (1) Thinking in general, I am proud of our system of government; (2) Our country should defend our way of life instead of becoming more and more like other countries.; (3) Thinking in general, I am proud of being a citizen of my country.

### **Cosmopolitan value**

For Nussbaum (1996), “world citizens” are those who are capable of breaking the barriers between distinct nationalities and ethnic groups. Furthermore, from the communitarian perspective, Slaughter (2005) claimed that citizens of democratic states are politically aware and cooperative concerning their efforts at creating responsive international institutions in a globalizing context. Therefore, “Cosmopolitan Value” is measured by aggregating questions: (1) How closely do you follow major events in foreign countries/ the world; (2) Which of the following statement do you agree; "Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority" and "Protecting the environment should be given priority"; (3) Given the chance, how willing would you be to go and live in another country?

### **Immigration**

The theoretical literature indicates that trust prospers in homogeneous settings (Uslaner 2002), and citizens with a pessimistic view of the economic situation will be less open to the immigration issues (Herreros and Criado 2009; Giles and Hertz 1994; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). Tolerance for “immigration” is measured by aggregating questions: Do you agree that the government should increase the inflow of foreign immigrants into the country?

## **3. Control variables**

To control the effect of the hypothesis on citizenship, the three variables associated with a given condition are set as control variables.

### **Household economy**

In order to explore the impact of household economy performance, individuals’ level of satisfaction with their household economic situation was measured by asking a single question, “Regarding your own family, how do you rate the economic situation of your family today?” with a range from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good).

### **Use of the Internet**

The Internet has become a tool so that people all over the world can connect to one another without any physical link. This study assumes that the Internet plays a significant role in shaping citizenship by forming like-minded networks and global connections, and by keeping communication more flexible. In order to explore the impact of online communication on trust and citizenship, the frequency of “Internet” use is measured by asking the question: “How often do you use the Internet?” with a range from 1 (Never) to 5 (More than a few hours a day).

### **Socio-demographic Determinants**

The following determinants are examined to find whether there is any demographic differences that could explain civic attitude in the three different countries: (1) gender; (2) age; and (3) education.

## **D. Questionnaires**

Based on the aforementioned speculations and research questions, a set of questions selected from the fourth wave of Asian Barometer Survey is as follows:

**Table 3. Questionnaires**

Questionnaire	Answer
SE2: Gender	1: Male 2: Female
SE3: Age (in decades)	1: 20s 2: 30s 3: 40s 4: 50s 5: Elder than 60s
SE5: Education	1: Up to middle school 2: Up to high school 3: Up to university or college school 4: More than graduate school
Q04: As for your own family, how do you rate the economic situation of your family today?	1: Very bad 2: Bad 3: Not-good not-bad 4: Good 5: Very good

Questionnaire	Answer
Q49: How often do you use the Internet?	1: Never 2: Less than once a week 3: Less than a half hour a day 4: Few hours a day 5: More than a few hours a day
Q07: Trust in - The President	1: None at all 2: Not very much trust 3: Quite a lot of trust 4: A great deal of trust
Q08: Trust in - The courts	
Q09: Trust in - The national government	
Q10: Trust in - Political parties	
Q11: Trust in - Parliament	
Q12: Trust in - Civil service	
Q13: Trust in - The military	
Q14: Trust in - The police	
Q16: Trust in - Newspapers	
Q17: Trust in - Television	
Q24: Trust in - Most people are trustworthy?	
Q26: Trust in - Your relatives	
Q27: Trust in - Your neighbors	
Q28: Trust in - Other people you interact with	
Q33. Did you vote in the last national election?	Yes or No
Q35. Did you attend a campaign meeting or rally?	
Q36. Did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party?	
Q37. Did you do anything else to help out or work for a party or candidate?	
Q74. Whether you personally have ever got together with others to try to resolve local problems	1: I have not done this, and I would not do it regardless of the situation
Q75. Got together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition	2: I have not done this, but I might do it if something important happens in the future
Q76. Attended a demonstration or protest march	3: I have done this once 4: I have done this more than once
Q84. Thinking in general, I am proud of our system of government	1: Strongly disagree 2: Disagree 3: Agree 4: Strongly agree
Q151. Our country should defend our way of life instead of becoming more and more like other countries.	
Q161. Thinking in general, I am proud of being a citizen of my country?	
Q150. How closely do you follow major events in foreign countries/ the world?	1: Not at all 2: Very little 3: Not too closely 4: Somewhat closely 5: Very closely
Q154. Which of the following statement do you agree?: "Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority" and "Protecting the environment should be given priority."	1: Economic growth 2: Protecting environment
Q162. Given the chance, how willing would you be to go and live in another country	1: Not willing at all 2: Not willing 3: Willing 4: Very willing
Q153. Do you agree that the government should increase the inflow of foreign immigrants into the country?	1: Strongly disagree 2: Disagree 3: Agree 4: Strongly agree

## **E. Data**

### **1. Source of data**

This study analyzes data from the fourth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS). Since the first survey from 2001 to 2003 for eight East Asian countries, each wave of the ABS has been conducted in approximately every four years. The fourth wave was conducted in 14 Asian countries from 2014 to 2016. The surveys used in this study were realized from June to November 2014 in Taiwan, from October to December 2014 in Singapore, and from October to December 2015 in Korea, respectively. The original sample size of ABS data is 1,200 from Korea, 1,039 for Singapore, and 1,657 for Taiwan. However, after eliminating cases with missing variables, a total of 908 cases are used in the analysis of Korea, 490 and 1,075 cases for Singapore and Taiwan respectively. Table 4 below describes the number of counts and the corresponding ratio on for answer from five socio-demographic questions.

### **2. Data analysis**

In subsequent analyses, to verify the hypotheses, socio-demographic elements are first analyzed based on descriptive statistics. Consequently, the independent variables and dependent variables are examined, via factor analysis, chi-square tests, analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests, and Pearson's and Kendall's correlations. Accordingly, the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables is identified, using binary logistic regression and multiple linear regression. Finally, the results of six hypotheses and relevant findings are addressed.



## IV. RESULTS

### A. Socio-demographic Variables and Basic Statistics

**Table 4. Socio-Demographic and Use of the Internet**

Variable		Korea (N=908)		Singapore (N=490)		Taiwan (N=1075)		Total (N=2473)	
		Counts	Ratio	Counts	Ratio	Counts	Ratio	Counts	Ratio
Gender	Male	444	48.9	264	53.9	574	53.4	1282	51.8
	Female	464	51.1	226	46.1	501	46.6	1191	48.2
	Total	908	100.0	490	100.0	1075	100.0	2473	100.0
Age	20s	130	14.3	117	23.9	159	14.8	406	16.4
	30s	170	18.7	122	24.9	249	23.2	541	21.9
	40s	202	22.2	131	26.7	244	22.7	577	23.3
	50s	190	20.9	75	15.3	229	21.3	494	20.0
	Over 60s	216	23.8	45	9.2	194	18.0	455	18.4
	Total	908	100.0	490	100.0	1075	100.0	2473	100.0
Level of Education	Middle school	46	5.1	43	8.8	105	9.8	194	7.8
	High school	501	55.2	210	42.9	603	56.1	1314	53.1
	University/College	354	39.0	212	43.3	259	24.1	825	33.4
	Graduate school	7	.8	25	5.1	108	10.0	140	5.7
	Total	908	100.0	490	100.0	1075	100.0	2473	100.0
Household Economy	Very bad	39	4.3	7	1.4	32	3.0	78	3.2
	Bad	293	32.3	31	6.3	144	13.4	468	18.9
	So-so	518	57.0	209	42.7	428	39.8	1155	46.7
	Good	57	6.3	199	40.6	462	43.0	718	29.0
	Very good	1	.1	44	9.0	9	.8	54	2.2
	Total	908	100.0	490	100.0	1075	100.0	2473	100.0
Use of the Internet	Never	118	13.0	15	3.1	176	16.4	309	12.5
	Once a week	150	16.5	50	10.2	142	13.2	342	13.8
	30 min/day	163	18.0	45	9.2	88	8.2	296	12.0
	1~2 hours/day	148	16.3	96	19.6	174	16.2	418	16.9
	Over 2 hours/day	329	36.2	284	58.0	495	46.0	1108	44.8
	Total	908	100.0	490	100.0	1075	100.0	2473	100.0

Table 4 describes the number of counts and the corresponding ratio for each answer from five socio-demographic questions. Detailed questionnaires can be found in Table 3.

Notably, the distribution of gender and age in each country is identical and equal in general.

The levels of education in Taiwan and Singapore are slightly higher compared to Korea. Also,

the people in Korea estimate their household economy pessimistically, which is not the case in Taiwan and Singapore. Additionally, in accordance with the result in Table 3, the Internet use rate is quite high in all three countries, as most of the people use the Internet more than two hours a day.

## B. Independent Variables: Trust

### 1. Descriptive analysis in each country

**Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the questionnaires on trust in each country**

Questionnaire (4 scale)	Korea (N=908)	Singapore (N=490)	Taiwan (N=1075)	Total (N=2473)
Q07: Trust in - The President	2.46 (.793)	2.98 (.716)	2.08 (.736)	2.40 (.825)
Q08: Trust in - The courts	2.35 (.726)	3.10 (.635)	2.13 (.688)	2.40 (.780)
Q09: Trust in - The national government	2.13 (.743)	3.06 (.725)	2.17 (.642)	2.33 (.786)
Q10: Trust in - Political parties	1.89 (.694)	2.76 (.768)	1.84 (.623)	2.04 (.769)
Q11: Trust in - Parliament	1.74 (.723)	2.94 (.723)	1.97 (.656)	2.08 (.824)
Q12: Trust in - Civil service	2.37 (.679)	2.99 (.725)	2.38 (.664)	2.50 (.724)
Q13: Trust in - The military	2.45 (.723)	3.04 (.710)	2.37 (.750)	2.53 (.775)
Q14: Trust in - The police	2.52 (.711)	3.06 (.729)	2.54 (.702)	2.64 (.741)
Q16: Trust in - Newspapers	2.55 (.722)	2.56 (.777)	2.10 (.667)	2.36 (.745)
Q17: Trust in - Television	2.60 (.722)	2.56 (.753)	2.14 (.678)	2.39 (.743)
Q24: Trust in - Most people are trustworthy?	2.64 (.642)	2.60 (.791)	2.71 (.580)	2.66 (.651)
Q26: Trust in - Your relatives	3.09 (.612)	3.13 (.745)	3.1 (.654)	3.11 (.658)
Q27: Trust in - Your neighbors	2.72 (.632)	2.57 (.794)	2.79 (.622)	2.72 (.668)
Q28: Trust in - Other people you interact with	2.32 (.676)	2.56 (.710)	2.85 (.558)	2.60 (.678)
Average	2.42 (.406)	2.85 (.469)	2.37 (.367)	2.48 (.443)

Table 5 demonstrates the mean of the questions about trust in each country, and the corresponding standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Trust in relatives and neighbors is higher than for institutions and the media in all countries. This result is aligned with the study of van Staveren and Knorringa (2007) on different types of trust relationships. Conversely, trust in parliaments and political parties are the lowest in all three countries. On average, the people in Singapore exhibit the highest level of overall trust, compared to the people in Taiwan and Korea.

## 2. Three domains of trust: factor analysis [Hypothesis 1]

### Analysis

This study performs a factor analysis of the entire samples and tries to extract three domains of trust. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.849 as shown in Table 6, which is close to one. Bartlett's test also has a p-value of 0.00. Hence, Bartlett's null hypothesis (i.e., its correlation matrix is identity matrix) is rejected. Therefore, it can be assumed that the results are meaningful.

**Table 7** shows the communalities of the result. As there are no small extraction communalities less than 0.1, all questionnaires can be applied to the following factor analysis.

**Table 6. KMO and Bartlett's Test**

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy	0.849
---	-------

Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	df 91 (p=.000)
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**Table 7. Communalities (Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring)**

Questionnaire	Initial	Extraction
Q07: Trust in - The President	.503	.459
Q08: Trust in - The courts	.546	.581
Q09: Trust in - The national government	.633	.681
Q10: Trust in - Political parties	.600	.560
Q11: Trust in - Parliament	.585	.533
Q12: Trust in - Civil service	.488	.509
Q13: Trust in - The military	.500	.444
Q14: Trust in - The police	.485	.417
Q16: Trust in - Newspapers	.616	.744
Q17: Trust in - Television	.611	.799
Q24: Trust in - Most people are trustworthy?	.212	.256
Q26: Trust in - Your relatives	.302	.364
Q27: Trust in - Your neighbors	.415	.647
Q28: Trust in - Other people you interact with	.312	.393

**Table 8. Total Variance Explained (Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring)**

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sum of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sum of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Var.	Cummulative %	Total	% of Var.	Cummulative %	Total	% of Var.	Cummulative %
1	5.249	37.491	37.491	4.802	34.299	34.299	4.097	29.263	29.263
2	1.998	14.271	51.762	1.466	10.469	44.768	1.700	12.141	41.404
3	1.386	9.903	61.664	1.119	7.993	52.760	1.590	11.356	52.760
4	.916	6.546	68.210						

5	.757	5.409	73.620						
6	.740	5.284	78.904						
7	.562	4.012	82.916						
8	.459	3.279	86.195						
9	.437	3.124	89.320						
10	.378	2.701	92.020						
11	.353	2.518	94.539						
12	.284	2.029	96.568						
13	.257	1.835	98.403						
14	.224	1.597	100.000						

**Figure 2. Scree plot**




Table 8 and the scree plot in Figure 2 validate that 14 questions can be divided into three different factors, namely, F1, F2, and F3. Also, Table 8 shows that the rotated sum of F1, F2, and F3 structures explain approximately 53% of the variance.

**Table 9. Rotated Factor Matrix and Three types of Trust**

Questionnaire	Factors			Rotated Factors			Domains of Trust
	F1'	F2'	F3'	F1	F2	F3	
Q07: Trust in - The President	.666	-.093	-.083	.649	.081	.177	F1. Institutional Trust
Q08: Trust in - The courts	.731	-.150	-.153	.747	.035	.147	
Q09: Trust in - The national government	.787	-.087	-.233	.815	.103	.081	
Q10: Trust in - Political parties	.727	-.083	-.158	.731	.098	.128	
Q11: Trust in - Parliament	.690	-.071	-.227	.722	.093	.049	
Q12: Trust in - Civil service	.703	-.040	-.118	.685	.137	.148	
Q13: Trust in - The military	.660	-.042	-.082	.633	.127	.165	
Q14: Trust in - The police	.644	-.007	-.052	.599	.160	.181	

Q24: Trust in - Most people are trustworthy?	.259	.432	.043	.125	.488	.046	F2. Interperson al Trust
Q26: Trust in - Your relatives	.276	.526	.104	.097	.588	.089	
Q27: Trust in - Your neighbors	.296	.736	.135	.059	.798	.084	
Q28: Trust in - Other people you interact with	.201	.591	-.058	.080	.614	-.098	
Q16: Trust in - Newspapers	.547	-.171	.644	.275	.048	.816	F3. Trust in the Media
Q17: Trust in - Television	.535	-.168	.696	.243	.053	.859	

The rotated factor matrix in Table 9 clearly displays the differences in the questionnaires affected by three factors. Therefore, in this study, the questionnaires are categorized into three types depending on the factors: F1. Institutional trust; F2. Interpersonal trust; F3. Trust in the media. It should be noted that as the factors are rotated to maximize the variance, it is obvious that those factors are mutually independent and normally distributed.

## **Findings**

**Table 10. Factor scores in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan**

Domain of Trust	Korea (N=908)	Singapore (N=490)	Taiwan (N=1075)
F1. Institutional trust	-.269 (.777)	1.050 (.853)	-.260 (.740)
F2. Interpersonal trust	-.115 (.851)	-.212 (1.004)	.194 (.779)
F3. Trust in the media	.376 (.878)	-.007 (.919)	-.312 (.829)

Consequently, the factor scores of Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, derived from the factor matrix previously discussed, are compared. Table 10 shows the mean of three factor scores in each country, and the corresponding standard deviations are given in the parentheses. Interestingly, all three domains of trust have different patterns in each country. Specifically, among the three types of trust, institutional trust (F1) is the highest in Singapore above interpersonal trust and trust in the media, while in Taiwan it is interpersonal trust (F2), and in Korea, trust in the media (F3) is the highest. On the contrary, the level of institutional trust (F1) is the lowest among the other factors in Korea, while in Singapore, it is interpersonal trust (F2)

that scores the lowest level. Specifically, in Singapore, people tend to trust institutions more than people, yet in Taiwan, the level of interpersonal trust is higher than that of television and the press, while in Korea, people consider the media to be the most trustworthy above institutions and other people. Accordingly, this distinct result also reconfirms mutually independent factor scores.

## C. Dependent Variables: Citizenship

### 1. Descriptive analysis in each country

**Table 11. Descriptive statistics of the questionnaires on citizenship in each country**

Questionnaire	Korea (N=908)	Singapore (N=490)	Taiwan (N=1075)	Total (N=2473)
Q33. Did you vote in the last national election? (Y/N)	774 (85.2%)	437 (89.2%)	886 (82.4%)	2097 (84.8%)
Q35. Did you attend a campaign meeting or rally? (Y/N)	137 (15.1%)	114 (23.3%)	121 (11.3%)	372 (15.0%)
Q36. Did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party? (Y/N)	90 (9.9%)	67 (13.7%)	145 (13.5%)	302 (12.2%)
Q37. Did you do anything else to help out or work for a party or candidate? (Y/N)	26 (2.9%)	33 (6.7%)	37 (3.4%)	98 (3.9%)
Q74. Whether you personally have ever got together with others to try to resolve local problems (4 scales)	1.56 (.726)	1.97 (.713)	1.87 (.862)	1.78 (.803)
Q75. Got together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition (4 scales)	1.57 (.760)	1.86 (.749)	1.83 (.846)	1.74 (.806)
Q76. Attended a demonstration or protest march (4 scale)	1.37 (.565)	1.53 (.668)	1.55 (.851)	1.48 (.726)
Q84. Thinking in general, I am proud of our system of government (4 scales)	2.19 (.793)	3.12 (.506)	2.31 (.664)	2.43 (.770)
Q151. Our country should defend our way of life instead of becoming more and more like other countries. (4 scale)	2.48 (.723)	1.96 (.597)	1.98 (.519)	2.16 (.662)
Q161. How proud are you to be a citizen of the country? (4 scale)	2.83 (.675)	3.22 (.598)	3.08 (.633)	3.02 (.660)
Q150. How closely do you follow major events in foreign countries/ the world? (5 scale)	3.36 (.853)	3.44 (.934)	3.68 (.919)	3.52 (.911)
Q154. "Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority" vs. "Protecting the environment should be given priority" (Choose 1)	1.39 (.488)	1.51 (.500)	1.71 (.452)	1.55 (.497)
Q162. Given the chance, how willing would you be to go and live in another country (4 scales)	2.31 (.890)	2.58 (.828)	2.37 (.779)	2.39 (.836)
Q153. Do you think the government should increase or decrease the inflow of foreign immigrants into the country? (4 scales)	2.61 (.775)	2.29 (.759)	2.54 (.746)	2.51 (.767)

Table 11 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the questionnaires about citizenship in each country. The table includes the counts of “Yes” and their ratio (in parentheses) for the questions with “Yes or No” type answers. On the other hand, for questions with two, four, or five-point scales, the table shows their mean and standard deviations (in parentheses). In the following



sections, the results are discussed in detail, and five facets of citizenship are defined as the dependent variables of this study.

## 2. Five facets of citizenship

### Analysis

#### **Electoral participation**

The dependent variable, “electoral participation” (Y1) is set based on the answers to Q33.

#### **Active participation**

To identify the relationships between the factors, chi-square (parametric) and Cramer's V (non-parametric) tests are conducted on Q35, Q36, and Q37 as seen in Table 12. Both test results support that the answers on Q35, Q36, and Q37 are closely related. In addition, “Yes” or “No” questions are considered dummy variables where “1” denotes “Yes” and “0” denotes “No.” Also, the sum of all three answers is set as variable Y2a that corresponds to “Political Participation.”

**Table 12. Chi-square and Cramer's V tests on Q35, Q36, and Q37**

Chi-square (Sig.)	Q35	Q36	Q37	Cramer's V (Sig.)	Q35	Q36	Q37
Q35	1	-	-	Q35	1	-	-
Q36	367.405** (.000)	1	-	Q36	.385** (.000)	1	-
Q37	234.262** (.000)	198.177** (.000)	1	Q37	.308** (.000)	.283** (.000)	1

\*\*Significant at 99%, \*Significant at 95%

Further, Q74, Q75, Q76, which indicate how actively citizens participate in social issues, are

expected to measure the level of “social participation” (Y2b). In order to evaluate the level of “social participation” and the previously defined “political participation,” Pearson's rho and Kendal's tau\_b are tested as shown in Table 13. Consequently, the result shows a strong and positive relationship among the answers to these questions. Therefore, a second dependent variable “active participation” (Y2) is constructed by taking the mean values of “political participation” and “social participation.”

**Table 13. Pearson's rho and Kendall's tau\_b on Q74, Q75, and Q76**

Pearson's rho (Sig.)	Y2a	Q74	Q75	Q76	Kendall's tau_b (Sig.)	Y2a	Q74	Q75	Q76
Y2a	1	-	-	-	Y2a	1	-	-	-
Q74	.247** (.000)	1	-	-	Q74	.200** (.000)	1	-	-
Q75	.265** (.000)	.551** (.000)	1	-	Q75	.216** (.000)	.584** (.000)	1	-
Q76	.269** (.000)	.344** (.000)	.521** (.000)	1	Q76	.226** (.000)	.376** (.000)	.510** (.000)	1

\*\*Significant at 99%, \*Significant at 95%

### **National value**

By averaging the answers to the following questions, how proud the citizens are of (Q84) the national system, (Q161) the country, and how (Q151) national identity is perceived, the third dependent variable “national value” (Y3) is defined. Table 14 demonstrates Pearson’s rho and Kendall’s tau\_b result for those questionnaires that show a relatively strong and positive relationship.

**Table 14. Pearson's rho and Kendall's tau\_b on Q84, Q151, and Q161**

Pearson's rho (Sig.)	Q84	Q151	Q161	Kendall's tau_b (Sig.)	Q84	Q151	Q161
Q84	1	-	-	Q84	1	-	-
Q151	.186** (.000)	1	-	Q151	.168** (.000)	1	-
Q161	.295** (.000)	.173** (.000)	1	Q161	.254** (.000)	.161** (.000)	1

\*\*Significant at 99%, \*Significant at 95%

### Cosmopolitan value

The fourth dependent variable, “cosmopolitan value” (Y4) is derived from (Q150) people’s interest in global issues, (Q162) willingness to live abroad, and (Q154) the priority given to environmental protection over economic development. The results in Table 15 demonstrate that although the answers to those questions are weakly related, they are in a positive direction. Accordingly, the “cosmopolitan value” (Y4) is measured as a weighted sum of Q150, Q162, and Q154, standardized to four scales.

**Table 15. Pearson's rho and Kendall's tau\_b on Q150, Q162, and Q154**

Pearson's rho (Sig.)	Q150	Q162	Q154	Kendall's tau_b (Sig.)	Q150	Q162	Q154
Q150	1	-	-	Q84	1	-	-
Q162	.063** (.002)	1	-	Q162	.057** (.003)	1	-
Q154	.105** (.000)	.104** (.000)	1	Q154	.107** (.000)	.074** (.000)	1

\*\*Significant at 99%, \*Significant at 95%

### Immigration

Lastly, as a fifth dependent variable, tolerance towards “immigration” (Y5) is set from answers to Q153.

## **Findings**

According to the answers to Q33, it can be seen that in all three countries most people vote in the national election. It is also shown that electoral participation (Y1) in the three countries score similarly. However, the results of the survey show that for all three nations, people rarely participate in campaign meetings (Q35), persuade others to vote (Q36), or work for a party (Q37). For active participation (Y2), it is shown that people in Korea are not willing to participate in political and social activities compared with people in Singapore and Taiwan. The citizens in Singapore are very proud of their own country and system as measured by national value (Y3), whereas the people in Taiwan score high in cosmopolitan value (Y4). It is also noted that the people of Korea are neither proud of their country (Y3), nor interested in global issues (Y4). Finally, in Korea, tolerance toward immigration (Y5) is nearly equivalent to that of Taiwan, but the people of Singapore are relatively close to immigrants. Table 16 summarizes the five dependent variables described above.

**Table 16. Five dependent variables on citizenship in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan**

Variable	Korea (N=908)	Singapore (N=490)	Taiwan (N=1075)	Total (N=2473)
Y1: Electoral participation	.85 (.355)	.89 (.311)	.82 (.381)	.85 (.359)
Y2: Active participation	1.496 (.588)	1.780 (.579)	1.702 (.616)	1.642 (.609)
Y3: National value	2.515 (.495)	3.126 (.386)	2.805 (.387)	2.762 (.484)
Y4: Cosmopolitan value	2.416 (.628)	2.643 (.652)	2.841 (.619)	2.646 (.657)
Y5: Immigration	2.607 (.775)	2.286 (.759)	2.527 (.748)	2.510 (.767)

## **D. Independent and Dependent Variables Affected by Control Variables**

In this section, the independent and dependent variables derived from Section IV.B and Section IV.C are compared, in relation to the control variables. As briefly discussed in Section IV.A,

five control variables constitute of the socioeconomic profiles: gender, age, level of education, household economy, and use of the Internet. In the following sections, this study aims to define the impact of control variables on independent and dependent variables in the different context of each country.

It should be noted that different analytical tests are applied. For instance, as gender is a dummy variable with two entries, ANOVA tests are used on independent and dependent variables to compare the difference. In Table 4 of Section IV.A, it is also shown that household economy roughly follows a normal distribution. Then, Pearson's rho is calculated to define the relationship of household economy to the independent and dependent variables. Lastly, Kendall's test is used to identify the relationship of the conditional variables that are normally distributed, such as age, level of education, and use of the Internet.

## 1. Gender

**Table 17. p-values of ANOVA tests for independent and dependent variables against gender**

Variable	Korea (N=908)	Singapore (N=490)	Taiwan (N=1075)
F1. Institutional trust	.383 (F=.762)	.834 (F=.044)	.418 (F=.658)
F2. Interpersonal trust	.133 (F=2.261)	.407 (S=.687)	.910 (F=.013)
F3. Trust in the media	.634 (F=.227)	.314 (F=1.017)	.951 (F=.004)
Y1: Electoral participation	.360 (F=.838)	.626 (F=.237)	.201 (F=1.639)
Y2: Active participation	.000** (F=13.628)	.015 (F=5.973)	.540 (F=.375)
Y3: National value	.738 (F=.112)	.623 (F=.242)	.691 (F=.158)
Y4: Cosmopolitan value	.551 (F=.356)	.968 (F=.002)	.582 (F=303)
Y5: Immigration	.440 (F=.596)	.166 (F=1.921)	.000** (F=14.249)

\*\*Significant at 99%, \*Significant at 95%

Table 17, Levene's Test denotes that the variances of all independent and dependent variables are equal to the control variable, "genders" in all countries. Therefore, one-way ANOVA can test the difference of the means. The significance levels of one-way ANOVA for almost all variables are also above .05 in all countries. Two exceptions are electoral participation (Y1) in Korea (p-value = .000) and immigration (Y5) in Taiwan (p-value = .000), which state a statistically significant difference. Table 4 in Section IV.A shows that in Korea, men are more likely to vote, and in Taiwan, men are more likely to be open to immigrants, compared to women. Except for those two cases, there is no gender difference on the variables.

## 2. Age [Hypothesis 4]

**Table 18. Kendall's tau\_b values of independent and dependent variables against age**

Variable	Korea (N=908)	Singapore (N=490)	Taiwan (N=1075)
F1. Institutional trust	.080*** (p=.001)	.109*** (p=.001)	.044* (p=.049)
F2. Interpersonal trust	.017 (p=.498)	-.048 (p=.149)	.036 (p=.107)
F3. Trust in the media	.073** (p=.003)	.077* (p=.020)	.068** (p=.003)
Y1: Electoral participation	.267** (p=.000)	.154** (p=.000)	.069 (p=.089)
Y2: Active participation	.134** (p=.000)	.031 (p=.202)	-.079* (p=.028)
Y3: National value	.165** (p=.000)	.137** (p=.000)	.082* (p=.028)
Y4: Cosmopolitan value	-.135** (.000)	-.205** (p=.000)	-.106** (p=.002)
Y5: Immigration	-.033 (.246)	-.124** (p=.000)	.004 (p=.919)

\*\*Significant at 99%, \*Significant at 95%

The results of Kendall's non-parametric correlation tests only show positive correlations, as seen in Table 18. In general, the higher the age, the higher the level of trust in an institution (F1)

and the media (F3), when compared to the younger generation. However, there is no correlation observed between age and interpersonal trust (F2). In addition, there is a strong and positive correlation between age and electoral participation (Y1) in Korea and Singapore, but not in Taiwan. With regard to active participation (Y2), age has a positive correlation in Korea, but in Taiwan, it is negatively correlated, whereas no meaningful correlation is seen in Singapore. In common for all three countries, age shows a positive relationship for national value (Y3), but in contrast, it has a negative relationship with cosmopolitan value (Y4). Compared to the cosmopolitan value (Y4) result, in Korea and Taiwan, no negative correlation is seen between age and immigration (Y5). However, in Singapore; there is a statistically significant and negative correlation.

### 3. Level of education [Hypothesis 6]

**Table 19. Kendall's tau\_b values of independent and dependent variables against level of education**

Variable	Korea (N=908)	Singapore (N=490)	Taiwan (N=1075)
F1. Institutional trust	-.051 (p=.055)	-.051 (p=.149)	-.009 (p=.701)
F2. Interpersonal trust	.003 (p=.902)	.003 (p=.933)	.019 (p=.433)
F3. Trust in the media	-.078** (p=.004)	-.136** (p=.000)	-.161** (p=.000)
Y1: Electoral participation	-.140** (p=.000)	-.044 (p=.302)	.001 (p=.960)
Y2: Active participation	-.016 (p=.586)	.162** (p=.000)	.093** (p=.000)
Y3: National value	-.119** (p=.000)	-.008 (p=.837)	-.062* (p=.017)
Y4: Cosmopolitan value	.149** (p=.000)	.118** (p=.001)	.289** (p=.000)
Y5: Immigration	.047 (p=.124)	.080* (p=.049)	.183** (p=.000)

\*\*Significant at 99%, \*Significant at 95%

As shown in Table 19, there is no correlation between the level of education and institutional trust (F1) and interpersonal trust (F2). One noteworthy result is the negative correlation between the level of education and trust in the media (F3) in all three countries. There is no common pattern in the relationship between the level of education and the dependent variables, with the exception of cosmopolitan value (Y4), which has a positive correlation with the level of education in all countries. Presumably, more educated citizens are likely to be exposed to foreign people and cultures more frequently. In the case of Singapore and Taiwan, active participation (Y2) and immigration (Y5) also show a weak but positive correlation with the level of education. Meanwhile, electoral participation (Y1) and national value (Y3) in Korea have a negative correlation with the level of education.

#### 4. Household economy [Hypothesis 5]

**Table 20. Pearson's rho values of independent and dependent variables against household economy**

Variable	Korea (N=908)	Singapore (N=490)	Taiwan (N=1075)
F1. Institutional trust	.104** (p=.002)	.192** (p=.000)	.120** (p=.000)
F2. Interpersonal trust	.122** (p=.000)	.358** (p=.000)	.144** (p=.000)
F3. Trust in the media	.108** (p=.001)	.191** (p=.000)	-.024 (p=.431)
Y1: Electoral participation	.070* (p=.036)	-.097* (p=.032)	.102** (p=.001)
Y2: Active participation	-.092** (p=.005)	.035 (p=.438)	.060 (p=.051)
Y3: National value	.077** (p=.020)	.147** (p=.001)	.127** (p=.000)
Y4: Cosmopolitan value	-.030 (p=.370)	.165** (p=.000)	.090** (p=.003)
Y5: Immigration	.035 (p=.294)	.211** (p=.000)	.074** (p=.003)

\*\*Significant at 99%, \*Significant at 95%



In Table 20, high positive correlations are seen between household economy and institutional trust (F1) and also with interpersonal trust (F2), commonly for all three countries. In particular, in Singapore, where relatively low interpersonal trust exists, we observe a strong positive correlation between household economy and interpersonal trust (F2). Trust in the media (F3) also has a positive correlation with household economy in both Korea and Singapore, but it does not have any influence in Taiwan. Electoral participation (Y1) is positively associated with household economy in Korea and Taiwan, while it is negatively related in Singapore. With regard to the relationship between economic satisfaction and active participation (Y2), a weak and negative correlation is observed in Korea, while there is no correlation in Singapore and Taiwan. It is also verified that national value (Y3) has a positive relationship with household economy in all countries. Both cosmopolitan value (Y4) and Immigration (Y5) have a relatively strong correlation with household economy in Singapore and only a weak correlation in Taiwan.

## 5. Use of the Internet [Hypothesis 6]

**Table 21. Kendall's tau\_b values of independent and dependent variables against use of the Internet**

Variable	Korea (N=908)	Singapore (N=490)	Taiwan (N=1075)
F1. Institutional trust	-.076** (p=.002)	-.114** (p=.001)	-.076** (p=.002)
F2. Interpersonal trust	-.029 (p=.237)	-.080* (p=.020)	-.029 (p=.237)
F3. Trust in the media	-.088** (p=.000)	-.135** (p=.000)	-.088** (p=.000)
Y1: Electoral participation	-.107** (p=.000)	-.127** (p=.003)	-.054 (p=.052)
Y2: Active participation	-.055* (p=.041)	.101** (p=.007)	.048 (p=.053)
Y3: National value	-.137** (p=.000)	-.026 (p=.508)	-.106** (p=.000)

Variable	Korea (N=908)	Singapore (N=490)	Taiwan (N=1075)
Y4: Cosmopolitan value	.123** (p=.000)	.140** (p=.000)	.264** (p=.000)
Y5: Immigration	.038 (p=.176)	-.003 (p=.943)	.129** (p=.000)

\*\*Significant at 99%, \*Significant at 95%

The use of the Internet clearly has a negative impact on institutional trust (F1) and trust in the media (F3) in all countries, as shown in Table 21. However, interpersonal trust (F2) is not affected by the frequent use of the Internet. Electoral Participation (Y1) and Active Participation (Y2) in Korea are likely to decline with frequent use of the Internet. In Singapore, Electoral Participation (Y1) shows a negative correlation with Internet use but a positive correlation with Active Participation (Y2). Admittedly, use of the Internet negatively affects National Value (Y3) in all countries, but it is not statistically significant in Singapore. The only variable that has a positive correlation with use of the Internet commonly for all countries is the Cosmopolitan Value (Y4). Use of the Internet also affects Immigration (Y5) in Taiwan in a positive manner.

#### **E. Independent and Dependent Variables: Regression Models [Hypotheses 1, 2, 3]**

The relationships between independent and dependent variables are measured by using binary logistic regression for Y1, which has a binary output, and multiple linear regression for the others (i.e., Y2, Y3, Y4, and Y5). The samples are based on nationality for the study of the relationships between independent and dependent variables. In the following sections, the coefficients (B) derived from binary logistic regression and multiple linear regression of the respective countries are summarized, along with the p-values shown in parentheses.

## 1. Korea

**Table 22: Coefficients of Binary Logistic Regression (Y1) and Multiple Linear Regression (Y2 to Y5) in Korea**

Variable	Constant	F1. Institutional trust	F2. Interpersonal trust	F3. Trust in Media
Y1: Electoral participation (R <sup>2</sup> =.004)	1.764** (.000)	.121 (.336)	.099 (.375)	.121 (.256)
Y2: Active participation (R <sup>2</sup> =.006)	1.517** (.000)	.055 (.033)	-.006 (.799)	-.021 (.350)
Y3: National value (R <sup>2</sup> =.152)	2.572** (.000)	.206** (.000)	.098** (.000)	.021 (.221)
Y4: Cosmopolitan value (R <sup>2</sup> =.018)	2.424** (.000)	-.057 (.037)	.081* (.001)	-.037 (.119)
Y5: Immigration (R <sup>2</sup> =.006)	2.605** (.000)	.020 (.546)	.050 (.105)	.035 (.236)

\*\*Significant at 99%, \*Significant at 95%

The abovementioned regression models yield the following equations for independent variables and dependent variables in Korea.

$$Y1\_Korea = 1.764 + .121*F1 + .099*F2 + .121*F3$$

$$Y2\_Korea = 1.517 + .055*F1 - .006*F2 - .021*F3$$

$$Y3\_Korea = 2.572 + .206*F1 + .098*F2 + .021*F3$$

$$Y4\_Korea = 2.424 - .057*F1 + .081*F2 - .037*F3$$

$$Y5\_Korea = 2.605 + .020*F1 + .050*F2 + .035*F3$$

Electoral participation (Y1), active participation (Y2), and immigration (Y5) in Korea are dominated by the constant as none of the coefficients are statistically significant and their R-square in the regression model is small. Therefore, this study claims that electoral participation (Y1), active participation (Y2), and immigration (Y5) are not correlated with institutional trust (F1), interpersonal trust (F2), or trust in the media (F3) in Korea. However, national value (Y3) is well explained (R<sup>2</sup> = .152) with institutional trust (F1) and interpersonal trust (F2), where both of the independent variables have positive coefficients. Cosmopolitan value (Y4) is mainly led by the interpersonal trust (F2) in a positive direction. It is also notable that trust in the media (F3) does not affect any of the dependent variables in Korea.

## 2. Singapore

**Table 23. Coefficients of Binary Logistic Regression (Y1) and Multiple Linear Regression (Y2 to Y5) in Singapore**

Variable	Constant	F1. Institutional trust	F2. Interpersonal trust	F3. Trust in Media
Y1: Electoral participation (R <sup>2</sup> =.012)	1.854** (.000)	.239 (.185)	-.235 (.122)	-.234 (.161)
Y2: Active participation (R <sup>2</sup> =.005)	1.816** (.000)	-.029 (.362)	.027 (.303)	-.025 (.396)
Y3: National value (R <sup>2</sup> =.114)	2.993** (.000)	.135** (.000)	.047* (.005)	.003 (.875)
Y4: Cosmopolitan value (R <sup>2</sup> =.018)	2.735** (.000)	-.075 (.035)	.063 (.035)	-.030 (.367)
Y5: Immigration (R <sup>2</sup> =.034)	2.252** (.000)	.061 (.136)	.107* (.002)	.043 (.261)

\*\*Significant at 99%, \*Significant at 95%

The abovementioned regression models yield the following equations for independent variables and dependent variables in Singapore.

$$Y1\_Singapore = 1.854 + .239*F1 - .235*F2 - .234*F3$$

$$Y2\_Singapore = 1.816 - .029*F1 + .027*F2 - .025*F3$$

$$Y3\_Singapore = 2.993 + .135*F1 + .047*F2 + .003*F3$$

$$Y4\_Singapore = 2.735 - .075*F1 + .063*F2 - .030*F3$$

$$Y5\_Singapore = 2.252 + .061*F1 + .107*F2 + .043*F3$$

Table 23 demonstrates that electoral participation (Y1), active participation (Y2), and cosmopolitan value (Y4) are not affected by the independent variables but are dominated by the constant. National value (Y3) is well explained (R<sup>2</sup>= .114) by using institutional trust (F1) and interpersonal trust (F2) where both are positively correlated. The only dependent variable that is correlated with immigration (Y5) is interpersonal trust (F2), which has a positive correlation. It is worth mentioning that trust in the media (F3) does not affect the dependent variables, and this same observation is made in the case of Korea.

### 3. Taiwan

**Table 24. Coefficients of Binary Logistic Regression (Y1) and Multiple Linear Regression (Y2 to Y5) in Taiwan**

Variable	Constant	F1. Institutional trust	F2. Interpersonal trust	F3. Trust in Media
Y1: Electoral participation (R <sup>2</sup> =.013)	1.540** (.000)	.115 (.299)	.347** (.001)	.014 (.886)
Y2: Active participation (R <sup>2</sup> =.012)	1.669** (.000)	-.026 (.312)	.079** (.001)	-.035 (.124)
Y3: National value (R <sup>2</sup> =.171)	2.853** (.000)	.194** (.000)	.062** (.000)	.029 (.024)
Y4: Cosmopolitan value (R <sup>2</sup> =.027)	2.783** (.000)	-.078* (.002)	.024 (.308)	-.104** (.000)
Y5: Immigration (R <sup>2</sup> =.010)	2.532** (.000)	.068 (.028)	.023 (.429)	-.057 (.037)

\*\*Significant at 99%, \*Significant at 95%

The abovementioned regression models yield the following equations for independent variables and dependent variables in Taiwan.

$$Y1\_Taiwan = 1.540 + .115*F1 + .347*F2 + .014*F3$$

$$Y2\_Taiwan = 1.669 - .026*F1 + .079*F2 - .035*F3$$

$$Y3\_Taiwan = 2.853 + .194*F1 + .062*F2 + .029*F3$$

$$Y4\_Taiwan = 2.783 - .078*F1 + .024*F2 - .104*F3$$

$$Y5\_Taiwan = 2.532 + .068*F1 + .023*F2 - .057*F3$$

In the case of Taiwan, electoral participation (Y1) and active participation (Y2) can roughly be derived from interpersonal trust (F2), where electoral participation (Y1) is more closely related to interpersonal trust (F2) with a positive correlation, compared to the weak correlation of active participation (Y2). National value (Y3) is explained by both institutional trust (F1) and interpersonal trust (F2). An interesting result comes from cosmopolitan value (Y4), which has a negative relationship with both institutional trust (F1) and trust in the media (F3). Lastly, none of the independent variables well describe immigration (Y5).

## F. Hypotheses Test Results and Summary of Findings

**Table 25. Summary of hypothesis test result**

<b>Finding</b>	<b>Hypothesis</b>	<b>Summary of Hypotheses test result</b>	<b>Result</b>
IV-B-2, IV-E-1,2,3	H1	Interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and trust in the media affect individual's citizenship in a distinct manner.	Supported
IV-E-3	H2	Institutional trust and trust in the media are positively related to national citizenship (electoral participation, political and social participation, national value).	Rejected*
IV-E-1,2	H3	Interpersonal trust positively influences citizenships related to globalization (cosmopolitan value and tolerance for immigrant population).	Partially supported*
IV-D-2	H4	All three countries will show considerable differences in age-based trust and citizenship, given the fact that all three countries have experienced rapid socioeconomic transitions over the last century.	Supported
IV-D-4	H5	Level of trust is positively related to the level of overall household economy satisfaction.	Supported
IV-D-3,5	H6	Level of education and use of the Internet positively influence citizenship related to globalization (cosmopolitan value and tolerance towards immigrants)	Partially supported*

Notes 1) H2: The correlation is found only between institutional trust (F1) and national value (Y3).

2) H3: Interpersonal trust (F2) is positively related to cosmopolitan value (Y4) in Korea and tolerance for immigration (Y5) in Singapore.

3) H6: A high correlation is found in all three countries between cosmopolitan value (Y4) and both the level of education and the use of the Internet. Besides, unlike Singapore and Taiwan, the level of education and the use of the Internet in Korea have no significant impact on the perception of immigration (Y5).

### **Hypothesis 1: Three domains of trust**

The results of the analysis show that the three countries have different trust patterns. Singaporeans are more trusting, showing a relatively high level of institutional, media, and interpersonal trust, compared to the other two countries. Among the other types of trust, Singaporeans have the highest trust in government, while the level of interpersonal trust is the lowest among the factors. Korea, however, has the lowest average trust among the three countries. In particular, institutional trust is lowest and interpersonal trust is not high either, while trust in the media is relatively higher than the other factors. Taiwan is known to be the

country with the highest level of freedom of the press among the group (Freedom House 2016). However, in Taiwan, the media seems to receive very low trust from the citizens because trust in the media is not only the lowest among the three types of trust but also among the countries in the group. Moreover, in contrast to Singapore, interpersonal trust is the highest in Taiwan. This outcome indicates that there is a contrasting trend among the three types of trust in relation to different national characteristics. Furthermore, the results of the statistical analysis confirm that the three types of trust are all mutually distinct.

### **Hypotheses 2 and 3: Trust and citizenship**

Following the above analysis, it is also confirmed that interpersonal trust and institutional trust are positively correlated with the dependent variable “national value” in all three countries. However, it is shown in both Korea and Singapore that all three types of trusts have no correlation with the level of commitment to voting (electoral participation) and active participation. Unlike the two other countries, in Taiwan, it was demonstrated that trust among individuals, increases the level of voting, and active participation. In addition, it is shown that interpersonal trust has a positive relationship with cosmopolitan value in Korea and in Singapore with tolerance toward immigration. Furthermore, it is confirmed that trust in the media does not contribute to revitalizing citizenship.

### **Hypothesis 4: Age differences**

It is also found that age matters for both trust building and citizenship. For all three countries, a higher age leads to high trust in institutions and the media, greater commitment to voting, and higher national value. It is plausible that as age increases, a more tolerant attitude is likely. By contrast, age and “cosmopolitan value” are inversely correlated in all three countries, and

as age increases, global consciousness declines. This also means that the lower the age, the more open the attitude toward global society.

#### **Hypothesis 5: Satisfaction with the household economy**

Additionally, it was confirmed that the higher the satisfaction with the household economy, the higher the average level of trust and the national value. In Korea, however, financial satisfaction is relatively low, and this positive effect is expected to be somewhat small. Also, in Singapore and Taiwan, it is confirmed that there is a positive correlation between household economy and global attitudes, such as cosmopolitan value and tolerance towards immigrants.

#### **Hypothesis 6: Education and the Internet**

Finally, for all three countries, the higher the level of education the lower the trust in the media, while education contributes to building “cosmopolitan value.” Particularly in Korea, education has a negative correlation with the commitment to voting and national values. In other words, a higher level of education leads to lower voting participation and national value. Notably, in all three countries, trust in the institutions and media, as well as national value, decline the more people use the Internet. In contrast, Internet use shows a positive relationship with cosmopolitan value, in all three countries.



## V. CONCLUSION

### A. Implications

The purpose of this study was to empirically analyze the relationship between trust and citizenship in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, in the context of globalization. Accordingly, the elements of trust were categorized into interpersonal, institutional, and trust in the media, and citizenship into electoral participation, active participation, national value, cosmopolitan value, and tolerance for immigration. Based on existing theories and previous studies, this study assumed that trust, as an important element of social capital, provides a positive mechanism for the engagement and role of citizens in specific societies (Putnam 1993). Therefore, this study aimed to examine whether the different functions of trust can be applied not only to the national boundaries but also to global society, taking into account socio-demographic characteristics.

Firstly, this study revealed that each of the three domains of trust, including institutional and individual trust, as well as trust in the media, is mutually distinct, while previous studies have mainly focused on general social trust and institutional trust. Particular findings of the analysis suggest that in Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, the level of interpersonal and institutional trust is highly correlated with the perception of national value. Contrasting results also suggest that interpersonal trust is expressed in Taiwan as conventional citizenship such as voting and active participation, while in Korea and Singapore, this type of trust leads to an open attitude towards globalization and immigrant populations. This result reconfirms findings from previous studies that distinguish between institutional trust and interpersonal trust (Kaase 1999; Newton 1999; Putnam 2001; Whiteley 1999). Additionally, the result found of trust in the media not affecting citizenship, which is different to other types of trust, can be inversely interpreted as evidence that media trust itself is an independent trust type.

Secondly, through the analysis of the control variables and regression analysis on the independent and dependent variables, this study also found that national value and cosmopolitan value are inversely related to the age and the use of the Internet, while positive relationships are manifested in the satisfaction level of household economy and interpersonal trust in Korea and Singapore. Thus, the empirical results partially verified the claims of alternative citizenship (Armstrong 2006a; Parekh 2003) by showing that economic satisfaction and interpersonal trust can concurrently enhance both national values such as patriotism and cosmopolitan attitudes towards other societies.

Finally, the descriptive statistical results show that people in all three countries do not actively participate in social and political actions, especially when compared to their commitment to electoral participation, which is a basic right of all citizens in democratic societies. This result reaffirms the arguments of Chang and Turner (2012) that citizenship in Asia does not necessarily lead to active social citizenship. However, even though the three Asian countries share traits of the Confucian tradition, trust and citizenship appear, as stated above, in very divergent ways. Further, the results show that citizenship of the three countries is changing rapidly, showing a marked difference in the manifestation of citizenship by age groups and the level of the Internet use. Seemingly, the younger generations are more likely to adapt to new information and knowledge via the Internet. In line with Bennett's "actualizing citizenship" theory (Bennett et al. 2011) the younger generations in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan tend to be more open to the outside world, less deferential to state citizenship, and tend to form institutional trust based on critical judgments as "rationally acting individuals," which is the fundamental of liberal' citizenship theories (Rawls 1971; Oldfield 1990; Turner 1993). In short, since institutional trust is closely linked to the government's performance and citizens' rational assessments (Della Porta 2000; Hetherington 1998; Pharr 2000), transparent and efficient management of institutional systems seems to be more important than ever to improve citizens' support of the government.

## **B. Limitations of the Study**

Firstly, the data set obtained from the Asian Barometer Survey was crucial in conducting this study. However, using existing survey data also caused some limitations in establishing more precise and accurate questions about trust and citizenship variables. Secondly, it is beyond the scope of this study to examine real-world case examples that could eventually bridge the gap between theories and statistical analysis. Therefore, for a more rational understanding and accurate analysis, a study of the causes and consequences beyond the theoretical and statistical analyses is required. Finally, another potential problem is that the scope of this study is somewhat too broad. It can be pointed out that the focus of the argument is a bit blurred, by applying several variables in the context of three different nations. In brief, it is highly expected that further research will be carried out on the role of citizens in the context of globalization through the lens of trust-building relationships.

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